Multiple memory corruptions in Microsoft Edge browser, there are several issues here but they all generally can be summed up as "self-corruptions".Its things like a use-after-free by opening a dialog, closing the backing page that spawned the dialog, and then closing the dialog triggering a callback that no longer exists...
Cisco's Jabber, an XMPP client would treat the ending `` XML tag as a special case resetting the state of the XML parsing, which would allow any next tag to be treated as the root of the XML document and allow injecting of control stanzas.
When a docx parser encounters an end element, it assumes the pointer to the start element is already available and attempts to operate on it, leading to an out of bounds access immediate before the buffer.
This seemed to mostly be an exercise in attack surface discovery, scanning the files used by Iconics they found support for `gdfx` files with support for embeded JavaScript, including the ability to load an ActiveX object and execute shell commands on the local machine. Despite this being an apparently surface level issue, it survived until Pwn2Own and through multiple other contestants (the author was 5th of 7 against the application) to net them a $20,000 bounty.
This is a cool trick, using a UTF-8 parser differential between the client XML parsing library (Gloox) and the server side (fast_xml), to smuggling in characters that would end an XML tag prematurely and smuggle in new XML content.
A Transparency Consent and Control (TCC) bypass in macOS.TCC is the subsystem responsible for gating off access to privacy settings and iCloud account data and such...
A nice little logic error abusing an edge case between two different command flags.Curl may remove the wrong file when `--no-clobber` and `--remove-on-error` flags are used together...
Blogpost by Microsoft that details a few vulnerabilities in the `networkd-dispatcher` component in `systemd` which can be chained for LPE.When looking at the code flow, they noticed it would register a signal receiver on the system bus, and the handler would receive a `state` path followed by some data...
BlueZ would identify bluetooth controllers based purely on their self-reported `BD_ADDR` (the bluetooth version of a MAC address). A malicious device could identify with an existing `BD_ADDR` and obtain the link key for that device.