The primitive in play here is a handle duplication attack, and basically the LogMeIn device driver has an IOCTL that will temporarily duplicate a handle specified by the caller (attacker). Along with allowing users to open the device with `PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE` one can open the device and then try to duplicate the newly created handle before it gets closed to continue to hold a reference to a privileged handle and use that for an elevation of privilege.
There is a lot going on in this post, the novel aspect are a few Mark-of-the-Web (MotW) bypasses, those MotW bypasses were found while exploring an in-the-wild exploit chain which is also covered here.
Effectively, a double-fetch vulnerability in Intel SMM's SMI handler that could allow a local attacker to escelate into System manage Mode.It recieves a `CommBuffer` that contains a `Data` pointer and a size value...
Kinda of a cool race condition and sort of differential attack deep inside XNU's virtual memory system that allows for bypassing "copy on write" and writing to the underlying page without making a copy.
A post on exploiting a bug that Jann Horn discovered in the linux kernel's memory management (MM) subsystem.The bug isn't detailed in this post and is fairly complex (there is a project zero bug report but it's difficult to understand without deep knowledge of MM internals), though they state it will be written up in a future blogpost...
A long chain of issues going from blind SSRF to new-line injection to a blind Livestatus Query Language (LQL) injection to arbitrary file deletion and finally a race condition leading to authentication bypass.